those suggestions of imperialism would certainly hold some credibility. Overall, the c oncept that “not intervening can be as great a risk as intervening” has ultimately been learned and applied by the UNSC following 1994 as a means of delivering their RtoP accountabilities, but must now be universally acknowledged by those advocates of purely non-forceful means. 333 6. Recommendations This final chapter will outline what I believe to be the three principle areas of reform needed from the UN in order to address the common concerns of the international community and amend the overall repute of the Security Council, which following a challenging, revolutionary post-Cold War period highlighted various aspects in much need of modification. Firstly, I believe the conditions set within Article 51 of the Charter permitting the use of force only “if an armed attack occurs” 334 is in much need of modernisation. Due to the nature of contemporary threats, the self defence strategy is no longer a plausible approach. For example, once an international terrorist organisation, arguably the greatest military threat of our generation, has carried out an attack, they will merge back into civilisation with no recognisable territory or population, making an effective retaliation extremely difficult, as demonstrated by the 9/11 attacks. Similarly, the magnitude of harm should also be accounted for. 335 The threat of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD’s) to cause “untold human 333 Shadi Hamid, ‘ Not Intervening Can Be as Great a Risk as Intervening’, New York Times, (16 th November 2015), <http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2015/05/18/iraq-bad-intelligence- or-a-lesson-in-bad-policy/not-intervening-can-be-as-great-a-risk-as- intervening> [accessed, 29/04/2016] 334 The United Nations, ‘ The UN Charter’ 335 John C. Yoo, ‘ Force Rules: UN Reform and Intervention’, Berkeley Law Scholarship Repository, (2005), pp. 650, <http://scholarship.law.berkeley.edu/facpubs/1372> [accessed, 30/04/2016]
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