The real lesson of Munich […] was counterintuitive [providing] the first clear evidence that even terrorist attacks that fail to achieve their ostensible objectives can nonetheless still be counted successful provided that the operation is sufficiently dramatic to capture the attention of the media. 46 This incident was arguably the ‘ideal forum to publicize the Palestinian cause’ and the media responded in full swing. 47 The second, and possibly most significant hostage situation took place at the United States Embassy in Tehran in 1979, in which sixty-three American hostages were held by supposed student demonstrators. 48 It could be debated that these situations ‘provide an indication of the strength of the dissidents and the weaknesses of the government’ depending on the rapidity and successfulness of the response, an area in which President Jimmy Carter failed. 49 The disastrous rescue mission that ‘killed eight American servicemen’ and the inability to successfully negotiate the return of the hostages, disillusioned th e people of America, highlighting Carter’s weakness as a leader and effectively ending his administration. 50 The significant media involvement of the increasing hijacking and hostage situations, during the 1960s and 1970s, would compel a response to address the global pandemic that is international terrorism from Washington. In the years prior to this point in history, presidents had been hesitant to address the issue of terrorism publicly, whether a result of pressing need in other areas of concern or a consciousness to subdue levels of fear and uncertainty among the American people. This was certainly the case with the earlier threats discussed. It could be argued,
46 Hoffman, p. 69. 47 Lutz and Lutz, p. 123.
48 Carol K Winkler, In the Name of Terrorism: Presidents on Political Violence in the Post-World War II Era (Albany: State University of New
York Press, 2006) p. 37. 49 Lutz and Lutz, p. 27. 50 Winkler, p. 38-50.
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