terror’. 94 This can be seen as successfully overcoming the attempt of terrorist groups to instil fear and division and encouraging a form of unity within the targeted state instead. Moreover, if the contemporary form of terrorism does signify a significant shift from older forms, it could be argued that the war model possesses the best possible solution to combatting it. Richard Shultz & Andreas Vogt note the tendency of groups such as Al-Qaeda to move away from hierarchical organisational structure, to more decentralised and flexible ones. 95 This could be argued to make policing and monitoring supposed terrorist groups more complex. Instead, as Paul R. Pillar suggests; a military approach to counterterrorism facilitates an easier means of disrupting a group’s operations by enabling the targeting of the upper echelons of the organisations. 96 The policing method, on the other hand, could be argued to be hindered by the transnational nature of the alleged new form of terrorism and the need for international cooperation to capture or detain these individuals. Leonard Weinberg argues that the capturing or killing of a terrorist group’s leaders is one of the most common causes of the demise of terrorist groups. 97 Therefore, we can note the relevance of a state’s ability to perform such a task. The benefits of a military approach to counterterrorism can be noted as providing a harder and more focused approach 94 James N Schubert, Patrick A Stewart, and Margaret Ann Curran, 'A Defining Presidential Moment: 9/11 and the Rally Effect', Political Psychology , 23.3 (2002), 559–583, p. 559. 95 Richard Shultz and Andreas Vogt, 'It’s war! Fighting post-11 September global terrorism through a doctrine of preemption', Terrorism and Political Violence , 15.1 (2003), 1–30, pp. 9–11. 96 Pillar, p. 467. 97 Weinberg, p. 31.
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