struggles in an attempt to show suffering to the international community, thus pressuring the Soviet Union to change its internal policies. Dissidents including Andrei Sakharov, Vladimir Bukovsky had correspondence with Carter or visited the White House, as Carter sought to show his support for their struggles. The administrations invitation to Soviet dissidents was viewed by the USSR as interfering with their domestic affairs. 156 Moreover, critics often show this as being counter-productive to other issues between the countries. Cyril Vance was worried such a stance would force a wedge in the relations between the two countries when confronted with larger issues. 157 Yet Carter himself noted that ‘I cannot recall any instance when the human-rights issue was the direct cause of failure in working with the Soviet on matters of common interest.’ 158 Nevertheless, the agitation shown by the Soviets towards U.S. policy demonstrates the potential for international embarrassment that faced them. The shift in policy to focus directly at the Soviets created exposure to problems that would otherwise remain undocumented. Carter’s attention to Soviet human rights, in particular on their treatment of dissidents, ‘became an important element of the executive branch’s approach to weakening the international appeal of Soviet-style socialism’. 159 Carter’s vision for a ‘reciprocal détente’ put pressure on the Soviet leaders to 156 Mary E. Stukey, Jimmy Carter, Human Rights, and the National Agenda (Texas A&M University Press, 2008), p.121. 157 Betty Glad, Outsider in the White House: Jimmy Carter, His Advisors, and the Making of American Foreign Policy , p51. 158 Jimmy Carter, Keeping Faith: Memoirs of a President , p.153/4 159 Christian Philip Peterson, The Carter Administration and the Promotion of Human Rights in the Soviet Union 1977-1981, Diplomatic History Vol.38:3 (2014), pp.629-656 (p.630).
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