fronts that lasted many days that would produce high numbers of casualties and rarely decisive victory. 198 The value of the machine gun was not learnt initially and took time to come into widespread service. 199 Lessons related to the use of artillery include the use of indirect fire by using a high angle of attack to bombard positions in order to supress machine guns. This also, therefore, changed the types of ammunition that were used; from fragmentation shells to high explosives which were capable of breaking up entrenched machine gun emplacements as well as entrenched infantry. 200 Despite what the Russo-Japanese war had shown, the lessons of indirect fire through high angle attack were not heeded resulting in a short supply of howitzers capable of such firing during the First World War. The British had only 18 such guns in an infantry division, the Germans with twelve, the Russians with three, and the French with none. 201 The lesson that the Battle of Tsushima seemed to reinforce was that of the battleship being the ultimate force in naval warfare; evident in the success that the Japanese had with the destruction of the Russian fleet. However, not all of the conclusions that were drawn from the conflict were uniform and there was much debate within the Royal Navy about the direction of the fleet. Admiral Fisher argued that instead of the construction of a small group of incredibly powerful battleships, the difficulty that the Japanese faced when attempting to destroy the Russian fleet whilst at port instead proved the need for submarines. In his letters to the 198 John W. Steinberg. "Was The Russo-Japanese War World War Zero?". The Russian Review 67.1 (2008): 1-7. P.21 199 Charles Townshend. The Oxford History of Modern War (Oxford University Press, 2005) P.117 200 Hew Strachan, European Armies And The Conduct Of War . (Hoboken: Taylor & Francis Ltd., 1983). P.117 201 Ibid. P.137
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