“in 1992 the ICRC estimated that 95 percent of Somalis were suffering from malnutrition”. 211 The U.N. initially implemented the 100-day programme to deal with the crisis, it was beneficial however, the scope of the crisis grew too large and complex for the programme to effectively deal with. Therefore, the relief mission continued to evolve in scale and complexity with the crisis, the U.N. implemented United Nations Operations in Somalia (UNOSOM) “authorized by resolution 775 (1992) of 28 August” 212 , to provide the humanitarian assistance “there is little question that the intervention stabilized ongoing aid efforts and eased the work of relief workers” 213 . However, it was not a final solution to the crisis. The humanitarian assistance operation preceded to evolve into Operation Restore Hope with the intervention of U.S. and U.N. troops acting as protection for aid against banditry and increasing the levels of health and food aid provided. This next step of humanitarian assistance and military intervention that took place in Somalia is a notorious case within the aid community and the subject of many debates over whether the relief mission and military intervention caused more harm than good. Critics of Operation Restore Hope argue on the other hand, that U.N. assistance came too late, as there was a successful harvest in 1992 and private aid agencies had filled in the majorities of the populaces need for food. This resulted in the U.N. aid package being distributed in an already 211 Thomas G Weiss and Cindy Collins, Humanitarian challenges and intervention: World politics and the dilemmas of help (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1996) 212 United Nations, UNITED NATIONS OPERATION IN SOMALIA I (UNOSOM I) 213 Marion Nestle and Sharron Dalton, 'Food aid and international hunger crises: The United States in Somalia', Agriculture and Human Values , iv, 11 (1994b), 19–27.
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