saturated market. The effect of this had an extremely negative impact on Somalia’s food market; “the distribution of rice, wheat and sorghum at no or low cost was depressing the market for locally grown corn”. 214 This meant that the foreign aid was undercutting the local farmers. This problem was compounded with the issue that the food aid provided was from external sources, meaning the Somalians were eating food that they were not familiar with, these foods were also ones that Somalian farmers were unable to grow locally as “Commentators noticed that Somalis had become accustomed to the rice used in the feeding kitchens and were no longer interested in eating locally grown corn or sorghum”. 215 There was a drop-in demand for local produce which led to the Somalian economy shrinking. This, in turn, led to an increase in levels of poverty in the country. The result of that was the Somalian farmers experienced a fall in revenue and were unable to grow the crops that were in high demand, such as rice. This led to food shortages further down the line, prolonged the suffering experienced due to the hunger crisis and extended the length that the humanitarian assistance was required in the country. It was clear that the emergency food was beneficial to the recipients in Somalia in the short run, alleviating severe malnourishment and malnutrition. The complexity of the emergency that was present in Somalia in 1992 was that “none of the well-established conditions for effective use of emergency aid were -early intervention, coordinated implementation, and functioning mechanisms for distribution were present in Somalia in late 1992”. 216 Effectively, these were barriers stopping an efficient food relief programme
214 Ibid. 215 Ibid. 216 Ibid.
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