The lessons of the war were not forgotten, and training of the Army concentrated on extension, concealment and cover, small unit tactics and a healthy respect for modern fire power. There were still many doubters to the lessons learnt in the veldt and they argued that the Boers fought differently to other armies. This was characterised by Sir Henry Colvile’s summation that the conditions of warfare in South Africa were exceptional and not likely to be repeated 11 . Eventually, the 1911 edition of the Infantry Manual reflected the concerns of many doubters and the tactic of extended formations was still included. However, the manual included a new caveat, that had an emphasis on masses of supporting fire from direct and indirect means including machine guns and artillery 12 . This allowed for the forward advance of troops in a dispersed formation who would then reform for the final push towards the enemy’s positions. During the early battles of the Great War British Infantry tactics used extension, fire and manoeuvre compared to the German and French forces who favoured the same deep and close order formations of the previous century. 13 The British had learnt the lessons of the Boer War and adapted them to combat against modern technology and masses of fire from machine guns and artillery at the outbreak of the Great War. This essay has considered only a specific area of change that the wars of the late 19 th and early 20 th century bought about in military thinking. The requirements of the length of the essay has prevented any inclusion or discussion of the use of earthen works, accurate rifle 11 Commision, Report of His Majesty's Commissioners Appointed to Inquire into the Military Preparations and Other Matters Connected with the War in South Africa, pp. 288. 12 Great Britain. War Office. General Staff, Infantry Training, 1911 , (London: H.M.S.O., 1911). 13 M. Gilbert, First World War , (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1994).
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