a change in the balance of forces clearly concerned him and others greatly, and it is not incredible to suggest that the drive to war was, in part, driven by this consideration. This chapter will explore this theme further, and in doing so will discuss the state of the Wehrmacht at the outbreak of war, the state of British rearmament in 1939, and the accompanying push for war by Hitler. On 24 May 1939 General Thomas gave a highly pessimistic lecture at the Foreign Ministry in which he laid out the significant challenges that Germany faced from a war with the Allies. Thomas stated that while ‘the western Great Powers are not yet pursuing rearmament with the same energy we are […] we must of course realise that the Western Powers … will be in a position to catch up with the German lead in 1-1½ years.’ 212 Thomas proceeded to elaborate on the inherent weaknesses of Germany’s rearmament in depth – it’s ability to endure in a long war – and of the superior staying power of the combined economic might of the Allies in this area. 213 And yet, while Thomas did paint an overwhelmingly negative picture of the Reich’s chances in the long-term, he also drew attention to his country’s considerable advantage in its rearmament in breadth – the number and strength of the armed forces in peacetime, and the preparations made to increase these in wartime. Thomas argued that ‘…we can perceive today German armament in its breadth and state of preparedness has a considerable start over the armament of all other countries.’ 214 In light of these two vastly different states of readiness, in breadth and depth of armament, Thomas speculated that the success of any war would depend on the Axis being able to bring
212 Noakes and G. Pridham, (1988), p. 124. 213 Ibid, pp. 123-124. 214 Ibid, p. 123.
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