‘… about a decision by a quick decisive blow’; if this was not successful ‘then the depth of military economic power, that is, the powers of endurance, will decide the issue.’ 215 It was, then, clear to the Reich’s planners and strategists that Germany’s proportional superiority faced a serious challenge, and most likely failure, in the event of a long drawn out arms race or war, and as such the only solution was to pull back from the brink or to become yet more belligerent. Considering the state of German arms in 1939 and the regime’s implacable hostility to backing down, it is unsurprising that the latter option was chosen. Moreover, the Reich’s leadership had good reason to be optimistic about its chances militarily, at least in the short-term. This was because, in the words of Tooze, even ‘If on the one hand Hitler knew that the outlook for the immediate future of the German armaments effort was not good, he also knew in the summer of 1939 that the Third Reich had assembled both the largest and most combat- ready army in Europe, as well as the best air force.’ 216 This is attested to by the fact that by September 1939 Germany had 103 full strength divisions, – twenty six more than in 1938 – of which seventy were fit for active service, while the remainder were still capable of static defence. 217 It was promising, moreover, that the Wehrmacht was now capable of defending Germany on two fronts. During the assault on Poland there would still be 11 first-rate divisions defending the newly finished fortifications on the Westwall that now formed a deep defensive system of 11,283 bunkers and gun emplacements along the Franco-German frontier. 218 It was, therefore, perfectly rational, on the basis of the increasingly uncontrollable dynamics of the international
215 Noakes and G. Pridham, (1988), p. 124. 216 Tooze, p. 315. 217 Carr, p. 120. 218 Tooze, p. 316.
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