arms race and Hitler’s own ‘mad logic’, for the Reich to charge toward war in the summer of 1939. Indeed, when one includes the Luftwaffe in this calculation then Germany’s prospects in a short war became better still. In 1939 the Luftwaffe was the largest and most well- equipped air force in Europe: possessing nearly 4,000 planes of modern design, and benefitting from operational experience provided by its participation in the Spanish Civil War through the Condor Legion. 219 As such, Tooze argues that ‘It was possible, in short, to construct a rationale for war in the autumn of 1939, considering only the dynamics of the armaments effort.’ 220 This rationale was indeed explicitly voiced by Hitler in an address to military leaders at Berchtesgaden on 22 August 1939; Hitler argued that ‘It is easy for us to make decisions. We have nothing to lose; we have everything to gain. Because of our restrictions our economic situation is such that we can only hold out for a few more years. Göring can confirm this. We have no other choice, we must act.’ 221 It is clear from this statement that while war in 1939 was not ideal, taking into consideration the dynamics of rearmament and military preparedness it was the best possible time for the Reich to embark upon one. In order to understand this pressing demand for an early war, it is necessary to briefly divert to the Reich’s principle enemy: Britain. As has been mentioned already, Britain had vastly increased its armaments expenditure from a low 8 per cent of its GNP in 1938 to 17 per cent in 1939. It was clear to Germany that Britain was rapidly 219 Tooze, p. 316. 220 Ibid. 221 Speech by the Führer to the Commanders in Chief on August 22, 1939, German History in Documents and Images (GHDI) , <http://germanhistorydocs.ghi- dc.org/sub_document.cfm?document_id=1546>, para 10, [07/02/2018].
107
Made with FlippingBook HTML5