increasing the rate of its military expansion and mobilisation for war at precisely the time that Germany’s efforts were increasingly under strain. In order to construct a coherent response to German rearmament and aggression Chamberlain’s cabinet were, from early 1939, involved in serious discussions about the military readiness of Britain, and the British Army in particular since it was the least well prepared of the three services. Such was the severity of the issue that these concerns dominated many cabinet meetings, such as that of 2 February 1939, where the army’s readiness was seriously questioned: ‘… the General Staff wished formally to call attention to the fact that present arrangements would not permit the Army to meet satisfactorily or safely the responsibilities it might be called upon to discharge […] the General Staff were greatly perturbed lest the present state of affairs might result in our soldiers having to run undue and unnecessary risks if they were sent overseas as at present equipped.’ 222 The same cabinet meeting also noted that at that time the army was not even equipped properly for continental service, which would require the re-equipment of four Regular divisions and four Territorial divisions for fighting on the continent. 223 To make matters worse for Britain, in the short term at least, another cabinet meeting on 22 February conceded that even if war were to break out it would be six months before even four divisions could be deployed to France. 224
222 CABINET 5 (39), Meeting of the Cabinet to be held at No. 10 Downing Street, S.W.1., on THURSDAY, 2 nd FEBRUARY 1939, at 11.0 a.m., pp. 3-4. 223 Ibid, pp. 5-6. 224 CABINET 8 (39), Meeting of the Cabinet to be held at No. 10 Downing Street, S.W.1., on WEDNESDAY, 22 nd FEBRUARY 1939, at 11.0 a.m., p. 20.
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