Britain in 1939 was wholly unprepared for a major war, while Germany in 1939 was in an incredibly strong tactical and operational military position, leaving Britain very limited in its ability to respond robustly to German aggression. If Britain and France were given more time, however, it is clear that they were willing to bear the burden of increased defence expenditure and heightened military preparedness to close the gap with and substantially confront Germany. Yet while Britain and France’s rearmament increasingly gained pace, it would not be fast enough to offer any meaningful assistance to Poland if Germany invaded in 1939. Thus, for the Reich it became increasingly necessary for war to be initiated, and soon. And while Hitler certainly hoped to be able to isolate Poland from the west without provoking a declaration of war from the Allies, he accepted the risk of provoking such a war and pressed on regardless. To speak of miscalculations and mistakes is to underestimate the deliberateness of Hitler’s intent; at a conference on 23 May Hitler stated unequivocally that ‘We cannot expect a repetition of the Czech affair. There will be war. Our task is to isolate Poland. The success of this isolation will be decisive.’ 225 This was followed with the stipulation that ‘If this is impossible [to keep the west out of the conflict], then it will be better to attack in the West and to deal with Poland at the same time.’ 226 Indeed this view did not change between May and 22 August, when Hitler argued once again in a speech to his generals that ‘The destruction of Poland has priority. […] Even if war breaks out in the
225 Minutes of a conference on 23 May 1939, in The Nazi Germany Sourcebook: An Anthology of Texts , ed. by Roderick Stackelberg, and Sally A. Winkle, Taylor and Francis, (Taylor & Francis, 2002), p. 233. 226 Ibid, p. 233.
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