Would it be possible for us to have free will if determinism were true? David Sinton – HUP100 This essay will be arguing that it is not possible for us to have free will if determinism is true. To do this, I will begin by broadly defining what is meant by these two terms before examining and challenging some arguments on the compatibilist side of the debate. The arguments I will be examining come from Kai Nielson, Harry Frankfurt and Susan Wolff. These philosophers provide a classic compatibilist argument, and deep-self theories respectively. After examining these arguments, I believe it will be clear to the reader that free will is not compatible with determinism and that each of these philosophers fail to demonstrate anything other than determinism may be false. It would only take one example to prove that free will is compatible with determinism, but I will argue that this is yet to be demonstrated. Firstly, determinism can broadly be defined as the theory that every event is causally determined by events that have come beforehand. Determinism is sometimes confused with fatalism which is the idea that whatever will happen will happen. Fatalism is just a logical truth and does not make any reference to causation which is the main point of determinism. Determinism also differs from constraints we face in life such as our genes, upbringing, and threats of reward or punishment. These constraints almost certainly determine some aspects of human behaviour, but determinism is an all-encompassing theory that requires all events to be causally by events that have come before. Free will can broadly be defined as free to do otherwise. An example is that I have chosen to write this essay, but I am equally free
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