self merely adds to the chain of causes and Wolff recognises this dilemma in her essay. 18 Finally, Frankfurt makes a separate argument that people can be held morally responsible for their actions if determinism is true and uses a thought experiment to attempt to prove this. In Frankfurt’s example, Jones is coerced into performing an action by Black. The action is to leave town, or he will be killed. Frankfurt then adds the condition that Jones wanted to leave town anyway, so the coercive threat had no bearing on his decision. This is meant to illustrate that Jones has chosen to leave town when he has not been free to have done otherwise. Frankfurt then anticipates that someone may object that jones could have acted otherwise. For example, the threat of being killed unless Jones sets off a nuclear bomb can, and surely should be ignored. To counteract this objection Frankfurt makes Black’s powers more sophisticated and allows him to read and control Jones mind. Now, Black can know what Jones will do in advance and if Black sees that Jones is going to act in a way that Black disapproves of, like, for example by not leaving town, then Black is able to hypnotize Jones so that he acts in the way that Black chooses. However, throughout Jones life it is not necessary for Black to use these powers as Jones freely acts in the way that Black would have chosen without the need for Black to interfere. In this thought experiment Frankfurt has shown that Jones is morally responsible for his actions without being free to act otherwise. Frankfurt concludes that people can be morally responsible for their actions if they really wanted to perform the action anyway. He believes that moral responsibility is compatible with
18 Susan Wolf, Sanity and the Metaphysics of Responsibility, in Free Will (Malden: Blackwell, 2002), pp. 145-163
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