determinism if the fact that the individual could not have done otherwise is only partly why they performed an action. 19 This thought experiment deals with the problematic first condition that is in place in Nielson’s conditions for freedom by making it impossible for Jones to do otherwise if he had chosen to while still seeming to demonstrate that Jones has free will. This appears to be a very strong analogy to determinism and how personal responsibility is compatible with it. However, the problem with this argument is that in a deterministic world, Jones’ actions are necessitated by previous events. There is nothing in this argument that suggests that the reason that Jones actions aligned with Black’s intentions is anything other than chance. Frankfurt does not address what caused Jones to act in the way that so happened to align with Black’s intentions. If determinism is true, then Jones actions were necessitated by previous events and he could not have acted otherwise with or without the addition of Black’s magical powers. If Jones had murdered someone and liked it then there is a utilitarian argument for imprisoning him as he may be more likely to murder again but that is a different topic as to whether Jones is responsible for what he has done. 20 In conclusion, if determinism is true, then it is not possible for people to have free will as their actions are performed to satisfy a desire and these desires are determined by previous events over which they have no control. If determinism is true, then the feeling of having control over desires which is guided by a deep-self is merely an 19 Harry Frankfurt, ‘Freedom, Responsibility and the Ability to do Otherwise’, in Western Philosophy An Anthology , 2nd edn, ed. by John Cottingham (Oxford: Blackwell, 2007), pp. 332- 338 20 Peter Strawson, Determinism and our Attitudes to Others, in Western Philosophy An Anthology , 2nd edn, ed. by John Cottingham (Oxford: Blackwell, 2007), pp. 326-331
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