in the 1970s and 80s which was “as extravagant in its criticisms of Kennedy as earlier writers had been in their praise”. 62 For this reason, it is hard to gain an unbiased perspective into Kennedy’s mind and gauge how he might have dealt with Vietnam if he had been re-elected in ’64, and obviously it is impossible to have a definitive judgement, but I believe a conclusion can be built on the facts presented. Before Kennedy died, he had both escalated the involvement of America in Vietnam, by committing 16,000 advisors to help the Diem government, but also ordered the first 1,000 to come home, so there is conflicting evidence which could be argued in both directions. My conclusion is based on the personality of Kennedy, and his experiences in foreign affairs and the military. During his WW2 mission with the PT-109 crew, he had seen that missions always have the chance of going horribly wrong, and as President he had seen how a bad mission can cause the loss of many lives which he was personally in charge of. In terms of foreign affairs, Kennedy had learned the lessons of bad diplomacy through the Vienna summit, but also seen how good negotiations can result in positives for both camps, like during the Cuban Missile Crisis. These are the main reasons why I believe John F. Kennedy, if re-elected as President in ’64, would have looked for a negotiated outcome with the communists in Vietnam, so that he could have withdrawn his advisors, and inevitably completely de-escalated the war in Vietnam.
62 White, p. 4.
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