part. Specifically, the use of deliberation for the purpose of legitimising decisions that will inevitably benefit certain groups over others. In examining this principle, Freeman makes note of legislatures of liberal democratic states, claiming that they dishonestly put forward their arguments as if beneficial to all. 119 However, in reality, this simply isn’t possible, and creates a culture of distrust and furthers polarisation. Citizens and representatives should be transparent about where they believe public resources should be directed, who exactly it will benefit, and why they deserve to receive these benefits. In doing this, deliberative models promote a collective and honest nature, and individuals and groups who aren’t benefited in certain areas are helped to understand the rationale behind it, rather than feel victimised and ignored. Consequently, alienation of sections of society is prevented, as they consider and understand why decisions that do not necessarily benefit them are legitimate and justified. The differing conceptions and ideas of citizenship also provide an insight into how and why deliberative models seek to overcome the participatory deficit that exists in liberal democratic states. Liberal theorists, when defining citizenship, by and large, emphasise individual liberty as opposed to involvement and participation. In keeping with this priority, the citizens’ role must be reduced to a bare minimum so as not to interfere with personal freedoms and liberties. By this logic, electoral turnout is the most accurate measure of useful public participation. This particular attitude regarding citizenship is undoubtedly the dominant one in western states and can be traced back to Burke’s famous justification for elitist representative democracy: “When you have chosen [a member of parliament], he is
119 Samuel Freeman, ‘Deliberative Democracy: A Sympathetic Comment’, Philosophy and Public Affairs , 29.4 (2000), 371-418, (pp.397-98).
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