enshrined values of the liberal democratic states that they seek to reform are in direct contradiction with the democratic principles that they promote. 130 Such values as familial privatism and possessive individualism are entirely incompatible with a culture of open discussion, understanding and debate. He further points towards the power structures found in institutions of liberal democratic states, and that maintaining them makes equal and fair debate impossible. The latter argument -- that republican forms of deliberative democracy are ultimately paradoxical -- appears to be the more compelling, leading to the conclusion that in order for deliberative models to be successful, they must replace those burdensome aspects of liberal democracy that hinder widespread public involvement and prevent equality in debate. This essay, in conclusion, settles on the case that deliberative forms of democracy can overcome the participatory deficit present in liberal democratic systems. Deliberative models’ ability to overcome this deficiency can be attributed, by and large, to how and where democratic legitimacy is sourced and how this differs from liberal models, and their transformative approach to citizenship. In only seeking to source democratic legitimacy from the final result of the decision, liberal democratic models deny the opportunity for public involvement in the crucial stage of the decision’s formation. Deliberative models, on the other hand, in holding the process of the decision’s formation as the primary source of legitimacy, rely solely on public participation (in the form of debate, discussion and argumentation) in order to work. By giving citizens a direct hand in shaping the decision, such models grant citizens a starkly more active and important political role. With regards to citizenship, in prioritising
130 Blaug, pp. 73-74.
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