choice as an ally, and in the view of Hitler, could just as easily play the part of an accomplice to his grand designs or be the victim to them. 148 As such, and after years of increasingly friendly relations, Hitler set about attempting to create an agreement between Germany and Poland, both before, during and after the Sudeten crisis of September 1938. 149 During the crisis Germany and Poland closely cooperated over the latter’s designs for the Teschen, a disputed area of western Czechoslovakia with a substantial Polish minority. This close cooperation extended even into the military sphere, with State Secretary Ernst von Weizsäcker reporting to the Foreign Ministry that: ‘This evening I showed the Polish Ambassador on a map prepared by the Headquarters of the Wehrmacht the demarcation line which, in the view of our Wehrmacht, should be observed between Polish and German troops if it came to an advance on Czechoslovakia. I added that it would no doubt be advisable if the Polish Military Attaché agreed on details with our military authorities tomorrow.’ 150 This cooperation continued for the duration of the Sudeten crisis, culminating in Poland gaining the Teschen from Czechoslovakia following the Munich Agreement. 151 So important was this cooperation that Polish Foreign Minister Józef Beck remarked that he 148 Wilhelm Diest et al, Germany and the Second World War: Volume I: The Build-up of German Aggression , ed. by Research Institute for Military History, Germany, (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1990), p. 591. 149 Ibid, p. 683. 150 Minutes by State Secretary (Weizacker) for the Foreign Minister, Berlin, September 27, 1938, in Documents on German Foreign Policy: 1918-1945 , Series D, Volume II, ed. John W. Wheeler-Bennet and others, (London, Her Majesty’s Stationary Office, 1950), p. 975. 151 Carr, p. 107.
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