decisions based on an individual regiment’s experience of warfare, which therefore resulted in great variations of military formations at the battalion level. However, the development of a more open order form of advance and assault as laid out in the Infantry Drill Manual of 1896 did allow some battalions to incorporate these adaptions into their fighting formations against the Boers with some success. A very effective example would be General Sir Ian Hamilton – who, whilst stationed in Ladysmith prior to the Battle of Elanslaagte on the 21 st October 1899, had begun a training regime with his brigade on tactical extension. During the ensuing battle, the 1 st Devonshire regiment attacked using a frontal extension of over 700 yards and a gap of over 450 yards between each firing line. They used fire and manoeuvre whereby one line would rush forward in the advance whilst another would provide continuous covering fire. 9 In the Elgin Commission of 1903, Sir William Gatacre espoused the use of extension and stated that the aim in training was to develop “…sudden, short, rapid and irregular in interval and strength, otherwise the defenders get many chances; each rush must be locally supported by comrades’ fire till the runners have settled down ready to support the next group in turn 10 .” By the end of the Boer War the infantry and, by extension, the British Army had developed the necessary tactics to face an enemy with modern fire power in a difficult situation. Although the beginning of the war had shown the Army to be inefficient for the conditions, it developed into a highly skilled and very capable fighting force.
9 J. Lee, A Soldier's Life: General Sir Ian Hamilton, 1853-1947 , (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2000), p. 49. 10 Commision, Report of His Majesty's Commissioners Appointed to Inquire into the Military Preparations and Other Matters Connected with the War in South Africa, p. 273.
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