would predominantly cost Russian, not British and French, lives, and that he was essentially opening the door to improved Russo-German relations. Negotiations for an Anglo-French alliance with Russia did, nonetheless, get underway following Germany’s annexation of Czechoslovakia, but there was little that the British and French could offer Stalin, whose primary motivation was defensive and expansionary, desiring to push Soviet frontiers further west into the Baltic States, Finland, Bessarabia and, if possible, Poland. 170 In addition to this difference in motivation between Russia and the West there was also a severe ideological gap. Britain, and Neville Chamberlain in particular, maintained a deep-seated distrust of Bolshevism, while Poland was largely hostile to any such alliance since it would reduce its importance and also leave itself vulnerable to Soviet encroachment. 171 It was, therefore, unfortunate for the Allied powers that just as their negotiations with the Soviet Union seemed to be going nowhere, Germany stepped in and attempted to forge its own deal with Stalin. In the months that followed Stalin would entertain both sides, seeing who could offer him the best deal, but ultimately Germany would succeed in finally securing what it needed: security in the east to deal with the west. In the months following the annexation of Czechoslovakia, while Paris and London tried and failed to reach an accord with the Soviets, Berlin and Moscow grew increasingly close. Emblematic of this newfound relationship between the two countries are the remarks of the Soviet Ambassador in Berlin to Weizsäcker, stating that: ‘Soviet policy had always moved in a straight line. Ideological differences had hardly influenced Russian-Italian relations, and
170 Diest et al, p. 698. 171 Ibid.
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