Thus, the signing of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact concluded a year of German diplomatic manoeuvres that had increasingly backed the Reich into a corner, where the lofty plans drawn up following the Munich Agreement had foundered against realpolitik. Key to this was Britain’s refusal to play the acquiescent role assigned to it by Hitler’s foreign policy; the stiffening resistance of Britain, France, and even the United States to German aggression had put the Reich on a collision course with the West, one which it was increasingly hard and also unwilling to pull back from. Instrumental to this collision was the attitude of Poland, whose absolute intransigence towards German designs, and who despite previous close cooperation, now proved integral to Germany’s increasingly reckless and warlike path. It is in doubt whether Germany, without the Russian pact, would have been able to do anything other than back down or enter a war in which it would have had no hope of success. It was no understatement when the Quartermaster-General of the German army, Colonel Eduard Wagner stated in reference to the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact that “the conclusion of this treaty has saved us”. 177 With the collapse of his long term strategic-vision Hitler chose instead to improvise a new one. It was imperfect and lacked many of the key elements of the previous one, and in particular it would start the war earlier than had previously been hoped. But with the Reich’s enemies seemingly growing daily more numerous Hitler chose to invade Poland in September 1939, knowing full well that it was likely to start a war with the Britain and France.
<http://germanhistorydocs.ghi- dc.org/sub_document.cfm?document_id=1546>, para. 33-34, [07/02/2018]. 177 Tooze, p321.
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