The Reich’s senior leadership was not, however, ignorant of these problems, and in a speech to the Reich Defence Council on 18 November 1938 Goering highlighted the danger of Germany’s ‘very critical’ economic situation as exchange reserves were ‘non- existent’. 187 Yet he nonetheless committed himself to somehow squaring the problems in the economy with continued and rapid rearmament. 188 But while it may have been politically convenient to attempt to avoid the economic problems through sheer force of will, they could not ultimately be avoided. Soon after Goering’s speech, the Chief of Wehrmacht High Command, General Keitel, issued a memorandum on behalf of Hitler stating that ‘The strained financial situation of the Reich makes it necessary that for the rest of the current fiscal year 38/39 the expense of the Armed Forces … should be lowered again to a level which would be tolerable for some time.’ 189 Significantly, then, no sooner than had the Reich established some degree of strategic coherence in the economy when, just as in the diplomatic sphere, conditions in the economy began to deteriorate. Just as the nations of the world would not bend themselves to the fantasies of Germany’s leadership, neither would the realities of economics yield to their dictums. It is thus necessary to briefly pause here and analyse the sheer absurdity of the plans drawn up in October and November 1938. The Luftwaffe’s lofty goal of beginning the war with over 21,000 aircraft was pure fantasy and could never have been achieved within the 187 Tooze, p. 290. 188 Ibid. 189 Documents for the conference at Field Marshal Goering's on 13 Dec 1938 with Supreme Commanders General Keitel, Neumann, Koerner, Gen. Thomas, in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression , p. 907.
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