economic boundaries of the Reich in 1938/39. Indeed, during World War II, the Luftwaffe’s maximum strength never exceeded the 5,000 aircraft they possessed in December 1944, 190 while Britain, who by contrast devoted a much greater share of its total armaments effort to the Royal Airforce still only acquired 8,300 aircraft, and even then only towards the war’s end. 191 Moreover, to have serviced such a swollen air fleet would have required the purchasing of massive fuel reserves totalling 10.7 million cubic metres for which the Reich would have needed to purchase no less than 3 million cubic metres of fuel per annum: twice the level of global production in 1938. 192 These plans had absolutely no hope of being achieved in peacetime within the prevailing boundaries of the Reich, and as such it would have been necessary to expand beyond those boundaries to have had even a hope of completing such an unrealistic plan. It was not just in the air that the Reich was entertaining fantasy. Plan-Z, the Kriegsmarine’s vastly ambitious plan to turn itself into a true ocean-going navy was another example of the sheer delusion permeating the Reich’s economic planning. Like the plans for the Luftwaffe, Plan-Z was not feasible. By 23 January 1939, before the plan had even been officially formalised it was already facing severe problems; construction was stalled due to insufficient deliveries of non-ferrous metals and bar steel, and there were also issues with obtaining sufficient numbers of workers. 193 It was clear then, before Plan-Z was even officially began, that it would face severe problems. Moreover, Plan-Z shared a parallel problem with the Luftwaffe’s own plan for expansion, which was the massive requirements for fuel
190 Tooze, p. 294. 191 Ibid. 192 Ibid. 193 Diest et al, p. 478.
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