needed once such an enlarged force became operational. The mobilisation requirements for the Plan-Z Kriegsmarine of fuel-oil would have amounted to an astronomical 6 million tons, and a further 2 million tons of diesel-oil. 194 To give this figure some perspective, the total German consumption of mineral-oil products in 1938 was 6,150,000 tons. 195 It was therefore hardly surprising that the Reich’s plans for military expansion hit upon serious problems almost as soon as they were conceived. Significantly, these persistent issues dogging the Reich’s rearmament drive were closely connected to its balance of payment issues and the subsequent problems with the procurement of raw materials. Germany at the outbreak of war in 1939 was still dependent on large imports of key raw materials amounting to roughly one third of the total requirement. 196 In some areas this dependence was even greater: 45 per cent for iron ore, 50 per cent for lead, and a staggering 99 per cent for aluminium. 197 With levels of foreign currency to purchase such products tumbling into non-existence, it was increasingly necessary for the Reich to step up its exports, as had been highlighted by Goering’s speech of October 1938. 198 Although such a switch was not without its own problems, as what followed from the decision to prioritise exports was a further drastic reduction in the steel quotas available for rearmament in 1939. The allocation of steel for the Wehrmacht fell from 530,000 to just 300,000 tons; this hurt all three branches of the Wehrmacht but
194 Ibid et al, p. 479. 195 Ibid.
196 Ibid, p. 355. 197 Diest et al, 198 Conference at Marshal Goering’s at 1000, 14 Oct. 38, in the Reich Air Ministry, Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression , p. 901.
98
Made with FlippingBook HTML5