raid exemplifies how unsustainable combat was for the German forces under Allied air supremacy. 27 Simultaneously, the lack of Luftwaffe aircraft hindered the German ability to field defensive sorties against Allied bombers, resulting in an eviscerating effect on German transportation, communication, and reserve lines. Rommel insinuates that Hitler was at fault for allowing this aerial supremacy by denying his request to transport anti-air to a more favourable position. 28 While a reasonable criticism and another example of poor leadership, this focuses on minute elements of the wider operational reasons for failure. Rommel’s criticisms are the exasperated expressions of a defeated general put in an almost unwinnable position. Hitler’s poor decision-making does not detract from the reality of the immense resource and manpower imbalance that faced the Germans defending Normandy. Harrison argues that the Atlantic Wall and Normandy defensive preparations were not up to strength to pose an effective resistance to the Allied landings. 29 This failure to prepare properly is attributed to the intensive Allied bombing campaign throughout early 1944. By impeding the transportation of critical building resources, such as cement, the fortifications lacked structural integrity against explosives, or were simply not built in time. At the Cotentin, the 709th division had only been able to prepare one out of forty two planned positions. Additionally, only 15% of the 352nd Division’s installations were bombproof, with the rest unprotected against aerial assault. This is a glaring issue considering the aerial supremacy of the Allies and the importance of the Cotentin during Overlord. At Cherbourg, the Seventh Army was only able to build 65% of their planned defences. 30 In Operation Deadstick, the Airborne encountered few obstacles and stakes due to the German army not having had the time to install them. 31 Cases like these were endemic throughout the German defensive lines, and Generalmajor Buttlar-Brandenfels noted that if the Allies were able to break through the main line at Normandy, their advance would be unhindered for several kilometres. 32 If the Germans could not rely on their defence, then this only strengthens the argument that the Germans only chance at victory was an aggressive action against the early invasion footholds. In April, Rommel decided to abandon the Zweite Stellung and instead re-focus his few available resources on the front line. 33 Rommel’s decision to abandon the Zweite Stellung and a proper defence in depth wasn’t due to misplaced strategic logic, but a reaction to the reality of available German resources. This exemplifies a core problem with
27 Keegan, Six Armies in Normandy , p. 235. 28 Rommel, p. 474. 29 Harrison, p. 264. 30 Harrison, pp. 261-2. 31 Stephen Ambrose, Pegasus Bridge (London: Pocket Books, 2003), p. 40.
32 Harrison, p. 263. 33 Harrison, p. 263.
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