on the Eastern Front in 1944 was refused by Hitler. 39 Hitler made empty promises to Manstein about troops which would never arrive. His political machinations for Lebensraum failed to acknowledge the military reality that the German army could barely afford to sustain the Eastern Front with commitments to Italy and France. While the overstretched Eastern Front already sapped critical manpower from Normandy, Keegan highlights the role of Operation Bagration in further diverting German manpower and resources. On the 12th July, Rommel was given only 6000 men to replace the 97,000 lost in five weeks of fighting. 40 The German forces simply did not have the attritional capabilities to continue fighting. When Operation Epsom failed, fresh Eastern Front Panzer divisions were forced to act as defensive units due to the inflicted losses. 41 The fact that Montgomery attacked again, only twelve days later and with a fresh offensive, demonstrates how unsustainable this conflict was for the Germans, regardless of tactical successes from their experienced men. They could only delay Overlord, not stop it. Along with the insanity of maintaining forces near unchallenged naval gun fire, this fundamental difference in attritional capabilities led Schweppenburg and Rundstedt to suggest another strategic withdrawal to Hitler. 42 A logical suggestion by competent generals, but it was again refused and they were fired. Both of these cases testify against Hitler’s generalship, demonstrating how his denial of the physical reality of German weaknesses significantly contributed towards them. It also reinforces an important split in the German leadership between the idiocy of Hitler and the sensibility of his generals. Hew Strachan states that technological innovation and incorporation is a key element of defining a modern war. 43 While the German state was mobilising its full economy for a total war in 1943, their lack of mechanization and reliance upon labour put them in stark contrast to the American’s capital-intensive modern war. 44 This resulted in a clear superiority of materiel, most clearly illustrated in the aftermath of the Battle of the Falaise Gap. The ruins of the fleeing German troops show an overwhelming reliance on horses or pack animals for transport, with a distinct lack of mechanized equipment. 45 As Strachan highlights, around ninety percent of the German army was dependent on horses throughout the war. A lack of industrial capabilities also resulted in German production being unable 39 Erich von Manstein, Lost Victories , edited and translated by Anthony Powell & Basil Liddell-Hart (London: Zenith Press, 2004) 40 Keegan, Six Armies in Normandy , pp. 238-240. 41 Ian Carter, ‘The German Response to D-Day’, 2018 <https://www.iwm.org.uk/history/the-german- response-to-d-day?fbclid=IwAR0hFDlE-pSE- BluttcTTIPyuFDQn9E0FUkw73l6TkiYXsdNP78pLjnotms> [accessed 03/05/2020] 42 Hastings, p. 211. 43 Hew Strachan, ‘Essay and Reflection: On Total War and Modern War’, The International History Review , 22.2 (2000), p. 351. 44 Strachan, pp. 351-3. 45 Lucas Barker, The Killing Ground: Battle of the Falaise Gap (London: Batsford, 1978) p. 20.
12
Made with FlippingBook HTML5