to meet the loss of equipment, with Panzer units rarely achieving full tank strength. 46 This reliance on manpower is an evident disadvantage in comparison with the Allied exploitation of technology. Looking at the wider picture, this contributed to the Germans not fighting the Allies on the same level. The Allies brought well-equipped and highly functioning combined arms with the industrial strength to support it, while Germany could barely maintain its decadent and patchwork assortment of last resources. 47 Operation Overlord was for the Allies to lose, rather than for the Germans to win. In conclusion, the German High Command should be partially exculpated from being the main reason for the defeat of the Wehrmacht. Instead, Hitler should carry the weight of the blame for poor leadership. Nonetheless, while one can identify several salient points where Hitler’s decision-making significantly hindered the German defence, it does not make his poor-leadership more of a determining factor than the materiel and manpower differential which the Allies used to dominate the Wehrmacht. Almost lacking a dimension in warfare, the near absence of the Luftwaffe restricted the land forces to a defensive role, where they acted as carrion for the Allied bombers. The Wehrmacht’s state of disarray was significantly contributed to by the Eastern and Italian Fronts, which minimised their available initial manpower, and destroyed their hopes of reinforcements. This numerical superiority for both the Allied land and air forces effectively determined Allied victory after their forces could be sufficiently established within Normandy. Allied intelligence and deception played impactful roles in empowering the initially frail invading forces, but it was still the gumption and fortitude of the Allied armed forces which ensured the physical victory. The sole hope for the largely second-grade German troops was in their esteemed panzer divisions, but even the most fearsome soldiers can not overcome overwhelming physical realities. The Wehrmacht’s failure to capitalise on the early vulnerabilities of the Allied beachheads enabled the Allies to bring their combined modern force against the outdated and outgunned Wehrmacht. From there, German victory was implausible. Bibliography Primary Sources Manstein, Erich von, Lost Victories , edited and translated by Anthony Powell & Basil Liddell-Hart (London: Zenith Press, 2004)
46 Strachan, p. 352. 47 Rommel, p. 481.
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