With his election to the White House, Nixon brought with him an effluvium of paranoia that corrupted his allies and enemies, the American people, and himself. Even those who worked in the White House during Nixon’s term were aware of ‘some kind of separate morality about things’, 9 and the so-called ‘Opponents list’, ‘underscored how the administration transmuted “opponents” into “enemies” in a manner that pervaded its policies and politics’. 10 Firstly, suspicions of Nixon’s ulterior motives were compounded when, despite signing the bill, Nixon declared the Defence Authorization Act as being ‘without binding force or effect’, as ‘it does not reflect my judgement about the way in which the war should be brought to a conclusion’. 11 One can derive from this statement that Nixon was intent on carrying out his own plans, rather than acting in the best interests of the nation. Mieczkowski highlights a further implication to the Presidents image: with the secret Watergate tapes revealing to the public their President’s true character, Nixon would ‘disgrace not only himself but the presidency, an office that Americans revered’. 12 This reaction highlights the public’s changing attitudes towards the executive, and how it was no longer considered a position of integrity. Nixon’s fear of his political opponents was released into the public sphere with the leaking of the Pentagon Papers through various media outlets. The devastating power these papers had over the public’s trust in government was highlighted by Daniel Ellsberg, the leaker of the documents, who is quoted in an interview that: ‘[the Pentagon Papers] made people understand that presidents lie all the time, not just occasionally, but all the time. Not everything they say is a lie, but anything they say could be a lie’. 13 To compound mistrust in Nixon’s government, Ellsberg’s sentiments were echoed somewhat bluntly by the Assistant Secretary of Defence, who is quoted by Mieczkowski as saying: ‘if you think any American official is going to tell the truth, you’re stupid’. 14 In addition to the undercurrent of doubt that surrounded Nixon and his decisions, there was also backlash from university students after revelations of the covert bombing raids in neutral Cambodia were revealed, and Brown notes the inflammatory reaction from protestors, who had been ‘revived overnight by the news’. 15 Emery writes of Kissinger’s response, warning Nixon not to awaken ‘the dormant beast of public protest’. 16 Both Brown and Emery provide evidence of the contempt and mistrust that the Nixon administration held towards those who dared to dissent, and the President’s wishes to tarnish the 9 Arthur Schlesinger, The Imperial Presidency (Mariner Books, 2004), p. 380. 10 Rudalevige, p. 65. 11 Rudalevige, p. 63. 12 Yanek Mieczkowski, Gerald Ford and the Challenges of the 1970s (University Press of Kentucky, 2005), p. 20. 13 Christian Appy, Vietnam: The Definitive Oral History Told from All Sides (Ebury Press, 2008), p. 436. 14 Mieczkowski, p. 19. 15 Seyom Brown, The Crisis of Power (Columbia University Press, 1979), p. 58. 16 Fred Emery, Watergate: The Corruption and Fall of Richard Nixon (Pimlico, 1995), p. 9.
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