Critically discuss the view that poor leadership was the main reason for the defeat of German forces during Operation Overlord
Gabriel Chalkley - WS-306
Poor leadership was not the main reason for the defeat of German forces during Operation Overlord. Germany simply could not match the immensely superior manpower, materiel, and intelligence of the Allies for a significant chance of victory. An ample visualisation of this disparity can be illustrated with comparing the nearly 1,500,000 Allied troops in France to the 380,000 German troops in late July of 1944. 1 Germany was a shadow of its 1941 strength, with the Eastern and Italian Fronts haemorrhaging manpower and resources that the state could not sustain. Regardless of the respectable efforts of its Normandy divisions, the German state was fundamentally unable to wage a modern war to match the resources and materiel of the Allies. This essay proposes that while Overlord’s long term success was nearly guaranteed by this immense strategic advantage, the German defence and ability for an early decisive victory was severely handicapped by the poor leadership. However, it is important to differentiate between Hitler and his competent generals. At vital parts of the defence, Hitler obstructed and waylaid his general’s abilities to maximise the Wehrmacht’s chances at victory. Overlord was an immense event of great detail, and this essay’s scope will be limited to the role of materiel, airpower, intelligence, and leadership as deciding factors for the German’s defeat. Overlord was a tremendously complex operation to plan and execute, but Liddell-Hart proposed that defending from a potential invasion was even more of a formidable task. There was 3000 miles of coastline from Italy to the north of Germany, with only 60 divisions to defend it. 2 From Rundstedt’s own admission, these divisions were low-grade and commonly lacked full strength. 3 The soldiers garrisoned in France worked as little as they could, and were commonly unfit for duty as a result of injury on the Eastern Front. 4 Defending the whole frontage was 1 Stephen Badsey, Normandy 1944: Allied Landings and the Breakout (Oxford: Osprey, 1990), pp. 84-86. 2 Basil Henry Liddell-Hart, The German Generals Talk (London: Endeavour Press, 2014), p. 142. 3 Liddell-Hart, pp. 142-143. 4 Max Hastings, Overlord: D-Day and the Battle for Normandy 1944 (London: Macmillan, 1984), p. 64.
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