Homage must be paid to the Allies as an invasion of this magnitude is a difficult task. While the Allies had the resources to field a second invasion in case of military failure, the political threat of failure was a strong motivator in ensuring copacetic planning. 11 These commanders understood the valuable lessons of previous amphibious assaults at Gallipoli, Dieppe, and Salerno, and Hitler’s fortified port strategy reveals a glaring underestimation of his foe's capacity to learn. 12 The beach assaults and Mulberry harbours demonstrate the dexterity and shrewdness of the Allied commanders in overcoming the difficulties of invading Normandy. A fundamental reason for the success of Overlord should be attributed to James Stagg, the Chief Meteorological Officer, who gave Eisenhower assurances that the 6th of June would be a safe invasion date. 13 The safety of the initial channel crossing and the required weather for safe logistics for embarked forces necessitated accurate forecasts, and it held the success of Overlord in the balance. His work was doubly effective considering the poor quality of the German weather assessment, which had convinced Rommel it was safe to travel to Germany. 14 Allied excellence was repeated in the espionage field, with every German agent sent to Britain having turned themselves in or been captured. 15 Combined with the significant advantage garnered from the Ultra program and cracking Enigma, the Allies dominated the intelligence sphere. 16 While Keegan appreciates how facilitating intelligence is to commanders, he reiterates the important point that war is still a physical activity rather than an intellectual one. 17 It set the Allies up for success, but it still relied on a physical victory, one that the Germans were poised to take if the fragile initial beachheads were not secured before the Allies could flood Normandy with superior manpower. It would be superficial to assume Operation Overlord’s success by reducing it to a contest of available manpower between the Allies and Germany. Considering the overwhelming power differential between the Germans and Allies, the only path to victory lay in an early tactical victory at a decisive juncture. Panzer Lehr Operations Officer Kurt Kaufmann argued that an early ‘determined thrust’ would have been successful in halting Overlord before it got off the beaches. 18 This claim is based on the effectiveness of the Panzer divisions of Lehr and Jugend as an offensive force, and the fragility of the initial footholds secured on the American, British and Canadian beachheads. As Caddick-Adams 11 David Wragg, Operation Neptune: The Prelude to D-Day (London: The History Press, 2014), p. 120. 12 John Keegan, Six Armies in Normandy (London: Pimlico, 2004), p. 120. 13 Wragg, p. 150. 14 Rommel, p. 470. 15 John Masterman, The Double-Cross System in the War of 1939 to 1945 (Australian New University Press, 1972), p. 20. 16 John Keegan, Intelligence in War (London: Pimlico, 2004), pp. 370-371. 17 Keegan, Intelligence in War, p. 369. 18 Hastings, p. 223.
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