notes, the Panzer Lehr division were elite soldiers from experienced units of the Panzerwaffe. In the face of Allied superiority, the Germans identified their strongest remaining point of defence, supporting the Lehr with superb materiel and armour compared to regular divisions. 19 Kaufmann’s faith in the Panzer Lehr was sensible considering how well the division later fought the British at Caen. 20 The specific targeting of the Lehr division by 1600 Allied Bombers on 25 July reveals how much of a threat they were considered to pose by the Allies. 21 The excellence of the Lehr division makes the fact that they were positioned 110 miles away from the beaches on D-Day even more alarming. Only the 21st Panzer was nearby the beaches, a division whose mediocre performance in Normandy made Hastings dismissive of their ability to seriously threaten the Second Army, even if Rommel could have been present to give the order. 22 On the 6th June, the initial beachheads were fragile. The Allies were separated and lacked supply. Most importantly, they did not have sufficient armour or anti-tank weaponry. Pegasus Bridge was defended by only one anti-tank gun, and Omaha beach had seen the majority of its tanks destroyed, reinforcing the threat posed by the Panzer divisions, especially if the Allies believed Rommel was commanding. 23 This hypothetical threat makes Hitler’s poor leadership stand out as a deciding factor in the success of Operation Overlord. However, it is important to remember that this would have only given the Germans a chance, and one can not assume German victory. Instead, analysis should focus on the tangible and certain factors which contributed to the success of the Allies. The Allies had overwhelming aerial superiority. On D-Day, the Luftwaffe were outnumbered 30:1 and flew under 100 sorties on the 6th June in comparison to the 15,000 Allied sorties. 24 Due to their inferior numbers, each fighter and his aircraft was indispensable to the Luftwaffe. Unfortunately, this meant that the Allied aerial offensives before and during the initial landing was unsustainable for the Luftwaffe, quickly turning aerial superiority into supremacy. 25 A frustrated Rommel argued that this disparity in air power between the Allied forces and the German Luftwaffe had a paralysing effect on the infantry and armoured divisions ability to operate offensively or to maintain defensive positions. 26 The Panzer Lehr losing 50% of their strength to one intense bombing 19 Peter Caddick Adams, Snow & Steel: Battle of the Bulge, 1944 - 1945 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), p. 111. 20 Gordon Harrison, Cross-Channel Attack: Official US Army History of Operation Overlord (Washington: Center of Military History for the United States Army, 1993), pp. 372-4. 21 Keegan, Six Armies in Normandy , p. 200. 22 Hastings, p. 220. 23 Hastings, p. 64. 24 Richard Hallion, Strike from the Sky: The History of Battlefield Air Attack, 1910-1945 (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama, 2010), p. 190. 25 Chris Goss, ‘D-Day and the Luftwaffe’, Iron Cross: German Military History 1914-45 , 1.1 (2019), p. 20. 26 Rommel, pp. 481-484.
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