identified or, if not and described as "persons unknown", must be capable of being identified and served with the order, if necessary by alternative service, the method of which must be set out in the order. (5) The prohibited acts must correspond to the threatened tort. They may include lawful conduct if, and only to the extent that, there is no other proportionate means of protecting the Claimant’s rights. (6) The terms of the injunction must be sufficiently clear and precise as to enable persons potentially affected to know what they must not do. The prohibited acts must not, therefore, be described in terms of a legal cause of action, such as trespass or harassment or nuisance. They may be defined by reference to the Defendant’s intention if that is strictly necessary to correspond to the threatened tort and done in non-technical language which a defendant is capable of understanding and the intention is capable of proof without undue complexity. It is better practice, however, to formulate the injunction without reference to intention if the prohibited tortious act can be described in ordinary language without doing so. (7) The interim injunction should have clear geographical and temporal limits. It must be time limited because it is an interim and not a final injunction. We shall elaborate this point when addressing Canada Goose's application for a final injunction on its summary judgment application. ”
55. Having considered all those elements, I am quite clear that care has been taken to make sure that they are all complied with in the present case. The protesters are restrained by reference to geographical and temporal limits and the relief is limited to such acts as it is feared that they will commit so far as that can sensibly be done. I am satisfied that all those requirements are fulfilled. 56. I have also had regard to the six requirements, summarised in the head note of the Ineos case, which cover some of the same ground as those in Canada Goose, and I am satisfied that all those requirements are fulfilled as well. I shall not lengthen this judgment by going through them one by one. It should suffice to say that I am satisfied for reasons which will already have appeared in this judgment. 57. Accordingly, I consider that this is an appropriate case for the grant of relief against Persons Unknown, and that those Persons Unknown are properly and adequately described in the action, and in particular in the order which I am invited to make. 58. Mr Maclean, pursuant to his duty of full and rank disclosure, which I am quite satisfied he has fulfilled, has drawn my attention to one or two points which might be taken if anybody were here arguing on the other side. The only one which I need to mention is this. As he points out in an email sent to the court, Mr Kidby seems arguably to be taking the point that it is inappropriate to be granting civil relief in matters where there is a criminal sanction. 59. There would be a criminal sanction under the bylaws, which, as I have already indicated, restrict, restrain or prohibit the commission of nuisances and undesirable behaviour on the Downs. It is not wholly clear that Mr Kidby is taking that point, but nonetheless Mr Maclean entirely properly raises it. The answer to that point, were it to be taken appears from Cambridge City Council v Traditional Cambridge Tours Ltd
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