Case 1:25-cv-14723 Document 10-1 Filed 08/19/25 Page 24 of 34 PageID: 96
Conference Committee explained, “[u]nder the exclusive grant of jurisdiction to the
Commission, the authority in the Commodity Exchange Act (and the regulations issued by the
Commission) would preempt the field insofar as futures regulation is concerned. Therefore, if
any substantive State law regulating futures trading was contrary to or inconsistent with Federal
law, the Federal law would govern. In view of the broad grant of authority to the Commission to
regulate the futures trading industry, the Conferees do not contemplate that there will be a need
for any supplementary regulation by the States.” H.R. Rep. No. 93-1383, at 35-36 (1974) (Conf.
Rep.), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5894, 5897; see also Hofmayer , 459 F. Supp. at 737
(finding field preemption from the CEA and dismissing claims brought under preempted federal
and state statutes). As the D.C. Circuit has recognized, “the statute’s legislative history
repeatedly emphasizes that the CFTC’s jurisdiction was ‘to be exclusive with regard to the
trading of futures on organized contract markets .’” Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Ken Roberts Co. , 276
F.3d 583, 590-91 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (quoting S. Rep. No. 93-1131, at 23 (1974), reprinted in 1974
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5843, 5863) (emphasis in original). “The passage of 7 U.S.C. § 2 is intended to
clarify ‘the preemption of all other would-be regulators at every level of government.’” Witzel ,
490 F. Supp. at 347 (quoting Jones , 466 F. Supp. at 219). Likewise, the history surrounding the
adoption of the “special rule” concerning event contracts in 2010 makes it clear that Congress
intended the CFTC’s exclusive jurisdiction to embrace event contracts. See 156 Cong.
Rec. S5906-07 (daily ed. July 15, 2010) (statements of Sens. Lincoln and Feinstein).
Congressional statements about the creation of the CFTC confirm the intent for broad
express or implied field preemption. The 1974 amendments to the CEA were motivated by
“concerns that states might regulate futures markets” themselves and create “conflicting
regulatory requirements.” KalshiEx , 2025 WL 1218313, at *1; see also Mallen v. Merrill Lynch,
17
Made with FlippingBook - Online catalogs