Case 1:25-cv-14723 Document 10-1 Filed 08/19/25 Page 25 of 34 PageID: 97
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. , 605 F. Supp. 1105, 1112 (N.D. Ga. 1985) (“The congressional
hearings focused on the need for sole regulatory power of commodities to be placed in one
federal agency, unlike the regulation of securities which is shared by a federal agency and state
agencies.”). Establishing the CFTC and endowing it with exclusive jurisdiction was meant to
“avoid unnecessary, overlapping and duplicative regulation.” Ken Roberts Co. , 276 F.3d at 588
(quoting 120 Cong. Rec. 34,736 (1974) (remarks of House Agriculture Committee Chairman
Poage)); see also 120 Cong. Rec. 34,997 (1974) (remarks of Sen. Curtis on behalf of Sen.
Talmadge); Senate Hearings at 685 (statement of Sen. Clark) (“[D]ifferent State laws would just
lead to total chaos.”). Accordingly, the CFTC was empowered to set forth uniform rules and
regulations for “all exchanges and all persons in the industry.” H.R. Rep. No. 93-975, at 79
(1974). 4 Congressional statements concerning the event contract “special rule,” including by the
drafters of the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010, are consistent with these earlier statements and reveal
clear Congressional intent to vest exclusive jurisdiction over event contracts with the CFTC. See
156 Cong. Rec. S5906-07 (daily ed. July 15, 2010) (statements of Sen. Lincoln conveying her
intent and that of Sen. Dodd); see also KalshiEx LLC v. Flaherty , No. 25-1922, ECF No. 66
(Brief of Amici Curiae Seven Former Members of Congress in Support of Plaintiff-Appellee)
15-23 (3d Cir. July 31, 2025).
4 As further indication of Congressional intent that the CEA preempt broadly, during the amendment process for the 1974 amendments, the Senate considered adding but ultimately did not include a provision that retained the states’ jurisdiction over futures trading. See Kevin T. Van Wart, Preemption and the Commodity Exchange Act , 58 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 657, 687-88 (1982); see also 120 Cong. Rec. 30,464 (1974) (statements of Sens. Curtis and Talmadge). Congress therefore could not have intended States to regulate futures trading in parallel with the CFTC. See INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca , 480 U.S. 421, 442-43 (1987) (“Few principles of statutory construction are more compelling than the proposition that Congress does not intend sub silentio to enact statutory language that it has earlier discarded in favor of other language.”).
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