Case 2:25-cv-00575-APG-BNW Document 237 Filed 11/24/25 Page 11 of 29
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That does not mean, as Robinhood argues in the related case, that the CFTC cannot regulate the listing of event contracts on DCMs if those contracts do not meet the statutory definition of the word “swap.” Under 7 U.S.C. § 7(d)(1), to “be designated, and maintain a designation, as a contract market,” a DCM must comply with the CEA and CFTC regulations. The CFTC thus can regulate a DCM under § 7(d)(1), even if it does not have exclusive jurisdiction under § 2(a). B. Kalshi is not likely to succeed in showing that its sports-related contracts are swaps. As relevant here, the CEA defines a “swap” as an “agreement, contract, or transaction . . . that provides for any purchase, sale, payment, or delivery . . . that is dependent on the occurrence, nonoccurrence, or the extent of the occurrence of an event or contingency associated with a potential financial, economic, or commercial consequence.” 7 U.S.C.A. § 1a(47)(A)(ii). I reaffirm my holding in Crypto that the word “event” in this definition means “a happening of some significance that took place or will take place, in a certain location, during a particular interval of time, such as a particular sporting event or an organized activity or celebration for the public or a particular group,” and does not mean an outcome. 2025 WL 2916151, at *8. And I adopt my preliminary conclusion in Crypto that “contingency” means a contingent event. Id. at *8 n.9. And like the contracts in Crypto , Kalshi’s event contracts are based on the outcomes of sporting events or on things that happen during a sporting event. Thus, they are not swaps within the CEA’s meaning. In my Crypto order, I did not address the part of the swap definition that the event or contingency must be “associated with a potential financial, economic, or commercial consequence.” Id. at *9, n.11. I do so now.
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