Case: 2:25-cv-01165-SDM-CMV Doc #: 69 Filed: 03/09/26 Page: 9 of 21 PAGEID #: 902
As the Supreme Court has recognized, “a statute’s meaning does not always
turn solely on the broadest imaginable definitions of its component words.
Linguistic and statutory context also matter.” Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis , 584 U.S.
497, 523 (2018) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Where, as here,
undefined terms lead to a dispute over a statute’s meaning, courts walk the “well-
trod path” of statutory interpretation. United States v. Fitzgerald , 906 F.3d 437, 442
(6th Cir. 2018). On the first pass, those terms are given their “ordinary and natural
meaning.” Id . (quoting United States v. Miller , 734 F.3d 530, 540 (6th Cir. 2013)).
But if “a word in isolation is susceptible of multiple meanings,” courts also consider
the word’s “placement and purpose in the statutory scheme.” Id . (quoting Miller at
540). Finally, “working only within the range of ‘textually permissible meanings,’
[courts] consider which of those interpretations would serve, rather than frustrate,
the statute’s manifest purpose.” Id . at 442–43 (quoting Antonin Scalia & Bryan A.
Garner, Reading Law 57 (2012)). It follows that “courts should not construe a
statute to produce an absurd result that [the court is] confident Congress did not
intend.” Id . at 447.
Kalshi gives the words comprising the “swap” definition broad meaning. It
construes “occurrence of an event” to include the outcome of a sporting contest ( Who
will win the NCAA football match-up between Northern Illinois University and Ohio
University? ) and happenings within it ( Will the total number of points scored in that
Mot., 7, 8; ECF No. 11-2, PAGEID # 248–49, 251; ECF No. 11-3, PAGEID # 260–61, ECF No. 11-6, PAGEID # 285.) Though tempting to engage with this question, it is the wrong one. The pertinent question here is not “Are sports-event contracts gambling?”—it is “Are sports-event contracts swaps?”
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