Case: 2:25-cv-01165-SDM-CMV Doc #: 69 Filed: 03/09/26 Page: 13 of 21 PAGEID #: 906
change, that result is absurd. Kalshi resists this point, arguing that the CEA leaves
Ohio “free to apply state laws to off-DCM transactions offered by traditional
sportsbooks.” (Reply, 9 (citing 7 U.S.C. § 2(a)(1)(A).) As the Hendrick II court aptly
described it, Kalshi’s argument boils down to this: “if contracts are not traded on an
exchange, then they are not swaps that must be traded on an exchange.” Hendrick
II , 2025 WL 3286282 at *9. Like the District of Nevada, this Court finds Kalshi’s
logic “self-fulfilling, circular, and inconsistent with the statutory text.” Id .
What’s more, the CEA’s legislative history indicates that at least some
members of Congress believed that sports-event contracts would not be considered
swaps. During a July 15, 2010 exchange with Senator Diane Feinstein, Senator
Blanche Lincoln (who, as Chair of the Senate Agricultural Committee, was a
principal contributor to the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act) acknowledged that “[i]t would be quite easy to construct an ‘event
contract’ around sporting events such as the Super Bowl, the Kentucky Derby, and
Masters Golf Tournament”—but that “[t]hese types of contracts would not serve any
real commercial purpose. Rather, they would be used solely for gambling.” 156
C ONG . R EC . S5906-07, 2010 WL 2788026 (daily ed. July 15, 2010).
Kalshi fails to clearly show that its sports-event contracts are subject to the
CFTC’s exclusive jurisdiction and thus fails to establish a likelihood of success on
the merits.
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