Case: 2:25-cv-01165-SDM-CMV Doc #: 69 Filed: 03/09/26 Page: 15 of 21 PAGEID #: 908
Kalshi argues that Ohio’s sports gambling laws are field and conflict
preempted by the CEA when it comes to sports-event contracts traded on its
exchange. 7 Congressional intent—as shown in a statute’s language, structure, and
purpose—is “the ultimate touchstone” of any implied preemption inquiry. In re Ford
Motor Co. F-150 & Ranger Truck Fuel Econ. Mktg. & Sales Pracs. Litig. , 65 F.4th
851, 860 (6th Cir. 2023) (quoting Cipollone v. Liggett Grp., Inc. , 505 U.S. 504, 516
(1992)). Kalshi fails to establish that Congress intended the CEA to preempt state
laws on sports gambling.
a)
Field Preemption
To examine the extent of the CEA’s field preemption, the Court must first
define the field in which the CEA has preemptive effect. Kalshi argues that the CEA
preempts “the field of regulating trading on DCMs[.]” (Mot., 11.) Ohio asserts that
framing is overbroad, and urges the Court to focus instead on whether Congress
intended to preempt state laws regulating sports gambling. (Resp., 21.) The
Supreme Court has “emphasize[d] the importance of considering the target at which
[a] state law aims in determining whether that law is pre-empted.” Oneok, Inc. v.
Learjet, Inc. , 575 U.S. 373, 385 (2015) (emphasis in original). Kalshi offers no
compelling reason to upset the recognized and “coherent federal policy . . .
7 Kalshi briefly argues in its reply that the CEA expressly preempts the application of Ohio’s sports gambling laws. (Reply, 10–11.) The argument is made only in passing and is thus considered waived for purposes of the instant motion. Cf. McPherson v. Kelsey , 125 F.3d 989, 995–96 (6th Cir. 1997) (“It is not sufficient for a party to mention a possible argument in the most skeletal way, leaving the court to put flesh on its bones.”) (quotation and alteration omitted).
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