Case: 2:25-cv-01165-SDM-CMV Doc #: 69 Filed: 03/09/26 Page: 16 of 21 PAGEID #: 909
respect[ing] the policy choices of the people of each State on the controversial issue
of gambling.” Murphy , 584 U.S. at 484. Instead, the Court finds several compelling
reasons why the CEA does not disturb Ohio’s sports gambling laws.
As in any implied preemption case, the Court starts with a presumption
against preemption. “Because preemption can trammel upon state sovereignty,
courts apply a ‘strong presumption’ against implied preemption in fields that States
traditionally regulate.” Torres v. Precision Indus., Inc. , 995 F.3d 485, 491 (6th Cir.
2021) (quoting Merrick v. Diageo Ams. Supply, Inc. , 805 F.3d 685, 694 (6th Cir.
2015)). The “enactment of gambling laws is clearly a proper exercise of the state’s
police power in an effort to promote the public welfare.” United States v.
Washington , 879 F.2d 1400, 1401 (6th Cir. 1989); cf Churchill Downs , 162 F.4th at
635 (noting that states “have traditionally regulated intrastate gambling activity
like wagering on horseracing”). It would thus be “inappropriate” to treat the CEA as
preempting Ohio’s sports gambling laws without first finding that Congress had the
“clear and manifest purpose” to do so. Wellons v. Nw. Airlines, Inc. , 165 F.3d 493,
494 (6th Cir. 1999) (quoting New York State Conf. of Blue Cross & Blue Shield
Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co. , 514 U.S. 645, 655 (1995)).
History reveals no evidence that Congress intended to preempt state sports
gambling laws. Consider the legal landscape in 2010, when Dodd-Frank amended
the CEA to govern swaps. At the time, the Professional and Amateur Sports
Protection Act (“PASPA”), 28 U.S.C. § 3701, et seq. , largely prohibited states from
authorizing sports betting; it allowed only the handful of states that already
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