Case: 2:25-cv-01165-SDM-CMV Doc #: 69 Filed: 03/09/26 Page: 17 of 21 PAGEID #: 910
regulated sports gambling to maintain their regimes. 28 U.S.C. §§ 3702, 3704(a). It
was not until eight years after the passage of Dodd-Frank that the Supreme Court
struck down PASPA. Murphy , 584 U.S. at 474. There is no evidence that Congress
intended the CEA to preempt sports gambling laws in those few states where it was
allowed under PASPA. In fact, all available evidence points to the contrary.
First, the CEA’s text and structure support the conclusion that Congress did
not intend to preempt state sports gambling laws. It is beyond dispute that the CEA
has, and was intended to have, some preemptive effect. But it is just as clear that
the CEA does not cover the waterfront of DCM-related activity. The language of 7
U.S.C § 2(a)(1)(A) illustrates the point. The statute gives the CFTC “exclusive
jurisdiction” over swaps and futures traded on DCMs. It goes on to say that, outside
of those swaps and futures, “nothing contained in this section shall . . . supersede or
limit the jurisdiction at any time conferred on . . . other regulatory authorities
under the laws of the United States or of any State[.]” Id . This language leaves
ample room for states to legislate and regulate, as Ohio has, on matters tangential
to trading swaps and commodity futures on DCMs.
Further, the CEA expressly preempts state gambling laws in certain limited
circumstances. See 7 U.S.C. § 16(e)(2) (preempting “any State or local law that
prohibits or regulates gaming or the operation of bucket shops” in the case of
electronic trading facilities and agreements excluded or exempted from the CEA
under enumerated provisions). But those circumstances do not cover the sports-
event contracts at issue here. As other courts have recognized, this is ”strong
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