Case: 2:25-cv-01165-SDM-CMV Doc #: 69 Filed: 03/09/26 Page: 18 of 21 PAGEID #: 911
evidence” that Congress did not intend the CEA to preempt state sports gambling
laws. Martin , 793 F. Supp. 3d at 681 (citing Cipollone , 505 U.S. at 517).
And finally, the CFTC has itself recognized Congressional intent to “prevent
gambling through the futures markets.” Provisions Common to Registered Entities,
76 Fed. Reg. 44776-01, 44786 (July 27, 2011). Indeed, that was the policy behind the
Special Rule’s public-interest review. See 156 C ONG . R EC . S5906-07, 2010 WL
2788026 (daily ed. July 15, 2010).
Kalshi thus fails to establish a likelihood of success on its field preemption
theory.
b)
Conflict Preemption
Kalshi also argues that conflict preemption applies because Ohio law poses
an obstacle to the accomplishment of Congress’s purpose and because complying
with both sets of law would be impossible. Both arguments fail.
Kalshi first argues that Ohio law poses an obstacle to the accomplishment of
Congress’s purpose in enacting the CEA. (Mot., 15.) In Kalshi’s view, once the
company “was approved as a CFTC-designated contract market, Kalshi was
authorized to list its event contracts by self-certifying that these contracts
comported with federal law. The CFTC had the authority to review that self-
certification on the ground that these contacts were ‘contrary to the public interest,’
7 U.S.C. § 7a-2(c)(5)(C)(i), but chose not to do so.” (Mot., 16.) By extension, Ohio’s
attempt to regulate Kalshi’s conduct “substantially interfere[s] with the CFTC’s
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