2026 Membership Book FINAL

Case 3:25-cv-06162-JSC Document 71 Filed 11/10/25 Page 8 of 13

Defendants ’ insistence Stand Up applies only in the context of § 2710(d)(1), but not in the

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context of § 2710(d)(7)(A)(ii), is unpersuasive for two reasons. First, Stand Up reasoned the

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compacts are equivalent to secretarial procedures for purposes of Sections 2710(d)(1) and

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2710(d)(6) because there is a “presumption that a given term is used to mean the same thing

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throughout a statute. ” Id . (citing Brown v. Gardner , 513 U.S. 115, 118 (1994)). So, the Court must

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presume compacts are equivalent to secretarial procedures in § 2710(d)(7), which immediately

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follows a subsection Stand Up addressed. See id. ; 25 U.S.C. §§ 2710(d)(6), (d)(7). Second,

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Defendants’ interpretation of Section 2710(d)(7)(A) “robs IGRA’s remedial scheme, which relies

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on Secretarial Procedures to ensure good- faith negotiation by states, of its force.” Stand Up , 959

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F.3d at 1160. Under Defendants’ reading, Tribes would lose the ability to enjoin unlawful Class

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III activity on their lands whenever a state refuses to negotiate a new compact in good faith – a

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situation over which Tribes have no control. As Stand Up warned, “such an incomplete remedy

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would create only feeble and ineffective incentives for states to negotiate in good faith.” Id. at

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1160. Like the Ninth Circuit, the Court “do [es] not believe that Congress intended such a result

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that would permit a state to be hostile to Indian tribes.” Id. at 1161.

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So, the Court has jurisdiction over Plaintiff s’ IGRA cause of action if they are seeking to

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enjoin activity “conducted on Indian lands” and in violation Plaintiffs’ compact or secretarial

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procedures within the meaning of subsection (d)(7)(A)(ii). But Plaintiffs have not established it is

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likely the Court has such jurisdiction.

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First, Picayune Rancheria has not shown a likelihood of success on its claim that Kalshi’s

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contracts are in violation of its Tribal-State compact. Plaintiffs contend “Section 4.1(c) of the

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Tribe’s 1999 Compact specifically prohibits internet gaming activities such as those being

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conducted by Kalshi.” (Dkt. No. 35 -2 ¶ 13.) Not so. Section 4.1(c) is silent about what

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companies like Defendants can do on the internet, and only outlines what “[t]he Tribe” is

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“authorized and permitted to operate.” (Dkt. No. 44-3 at 13.) Specifically, “the Tribe will not

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offer [certain] games through use of the Internet unless others in the state are permitted to do so.”

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(Dkt. No. 44-3 at 13.) Second, Blue Lake’s and Chicken Ranch’s secretarial procedures have the

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same language, and thus do not mention what companies like Kalshi can do on the internet. (Dkt.

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