Case 2:25-cv-01541-JCM-DJA Document 7 Filed 08/19/25 Page 19 of 31
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same event contract products are at issue here as were at issue in KalshiEx , and the same result should follow: transactions involving sports-related event contracts traded on Kalshi’s designated contract market—regardless of whether the trade orders come directly to Kalshi from Kalshi’s customers or indirectly to Kalshi from Robinhood’s customers—are subject to the CFTC’s exclusive jurisdiction, and Nevada law is preempted to the extent it purports to regulate those transactions. A. The CEA Preempts Application of State Gaming Laws to Sports-Related Event Contract Trading on CFTC-Designated Exchanges. The Constitution and laws of the United States “shall be the supreme Law of the Land,” U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2, and accordingly, “Congress has the power to preempt state law.” Crosby v. Nat. Foreign Trade Council , 530 U.S. 363, 372 (2000). Federal law can preempt state law expressly, through a statement to that effect in the statute itself, or impliedly, through either field preemption or conflict preemption. Field preemption exists where Congress manifests an intent to occupy exclusively an entire field of regulation. See Fidelity Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. De la Cuesta , 458 U.S. 141, 153 (1982). Conflict preemption exists where compliance with federal and state law is “a physical impossibility” or when “state law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.” Id. (internal quotation omitted). Here, as the Court already found, the statutory language of the CEA, its legislative history and the comprehensive regulatory framework it sets out demonstrate that Congress deliberately preempted state law. Whether analyzed as express or implied preemption,
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jurisdiction); Jones v. B.C. Christopher & Co. , 466 F. Supp. 213, 220 (D. Kan. 1979) (recognizing that “[i]t is now established . . . that the SEC and other federal agencies are ‘stripped’ of authority to regulate commodities transactions and that state regulatory agencies are likewise preempted by the ‘exclusive jurisdiction’ of the CFTC” (internal citations omitted)); Bartels v. Int’l Commodities Corp. , 435 F. Supp. 865, 869 (D. Conn. 1977) (with “its own sphere,” the CFTC displaced the Securities and Exchange Commission’s previous authority over commodity options trading).
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