Case 2:25-cv-01541-JCM-DJA Document 7 Filed 08/19/25 Page 24 of 31
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Rec. 34,736 (1974) (remarks of House Agriculture Committee Chairman Poage)); see also 120 Cong. Rec. 34,997 (1974) (remarks of Sen. Curtis on behalf of Sen. Talmadge); Senate Hearings at 685 (statement of Sen. Clark) (“[D]ifferent State laws would just lead to total chaos.”). Accordingly, the CFTC was empowered to set forth uniform rules and regulations for “all exchanges and all persons in the industry.” H.R. Rep. No. 93-975, at 79 (1974). 4 Congressional statements concerning the event contract “special rule,” including by the drafters of the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010, are consistent with these earlier statements and reveal clear Congressional intent to vest exclusive jurisdiction over event contracts with the CFTC. See 156 Cong. Rec. S5906-07 (daily ed. July 15, 2010) (statements of Sen. Lincoln conveying her intent and that of Sen. Dodd); see also KalshiEx LLC v. Flaherty , No. 25-1922, ECF No. 66 (Brief of Amici Curiae Seven Former Members of Congress in Support of Plaintiff-Appellee) 15-23 (3d Cir. July 31, 2025). Third , the regulatory scheme set out in the CEA, over which the CFTC has exclusive jurisdiction, is comprehensive as it relates to designated and registered entities, and the existence of this comprehensive scheme further evinces Congressional intent to preempt the field and foreclose parallel state regulation. See Arizona v. United States , 567 U.S. 387, 401 (2012) (comprehensive statutory framework led to the conclusion that “the Federal Government has occupied the field” in the relevant area); La. Pub. Serv. Comm’n v. FCC , 476 U.S. 355, 368-69 (1986) (“Pre-emption occurs . . . where Congress has legislated comprehensively, thus occupying an entire field of regulation and leaving no room for the States to supplement federal law . . . .”). 4 As further indication of Congressional intent that the CEA preempt broadly, during the amendment process for the 1974 amendments, the Senate considered adding but did not include a provision that retained the states’ jurisdiction over futures trading. See Kevin T. Van Wart, Preemption and the Commodity Exchange Act , 58 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 657, 687-88 (1982); see also 120 Cong. Rec. 30,464 (1974) (statements of Sens. Curtis and Talmadge). Congress therefore could not have intended States to regulate futures trading in parallel with the CFTC. See INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca , 480 U.S. 421, 442-43 (1987) (“Few principles of statutory construction are more compelling than the proposition that Congress does not intend sub silentio to enact statutory language that it has earlier discarded in favor of other language.”).
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