Case 2:25-cv-01541-JCM-DJA Document 7 Filed 08/19/25 Page 30 of 31
III.
THE EQUITIES AND PUBLIC INTEREST TILT STRONGLY IN ROBINHOOD’S FAVOR. The balance of harms strongly favors Robinhood, just as it did for Kalshi. If the Court
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does not grant the requested temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction, the harm to Robinhood will be significant. By contrast, the Board and the public would suffer little to no harm if the requested relief is granted. The interests favor injunction because Robinhood can demonstrate that Nevada law is likely preempted as to the transactions at issue involving sports-related event contract trades through Kalshi’s CFTC-designated market, just as Kalshi did. See Valle del Sol Inc. v. Whiting , 732 F.3d 1006, 1029 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting United States v. Arizona , 641 F.3d 339, 365 (9th Cir. 2011)) (“[I]t is clear that it would not be equitable or in the public’s interest to allow the state . . . to violate the requirements of federal law, especially when there are no adequate remedies available.”). The state of Nevada, and the public generally, can have no interest in enforcing preempted state law against Robinhood. Id . “The balance of hardships tips in [movant’s] favor given that [plaintiff] is facing substantial monetary expenditures, reputational damages, or civil and criminal prosecution based on the defendants’ demands that the defendants likely cannot make because they are preempted.” KalshiEx , 2025 WL 1073495, at *7. The equities here strongly favor the issuance of an injunction. IV. NO SECURITY—OR ONLY DE MINIMIS SECURITY—IS APPROPRIATE. A party seeking a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction must “give[] security in an amount that the court considers proper to pay the costs and damages sustained by any party found to have been wrongfully enjoined or restrained.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(c). The amount of the bond is left to the discretion of the Court. Jorgensen v. Cassiday , 320 F.3d 906, 919 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting Barahona-Gomez v. Reno , 167 F.3d 1228, 1237 (9th Cir. 1999)). Here, no security is needed because Defendants will not suffer any non-speculative harm by delaying enforcement. See Jorgensen , 320 F.3d at 919 (affirming decision not to require bond). Recognizing, however, that this Court held that a de minimis bond was appropriate for
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