Case 4:25-cv-14092-SDK-KGA ECF No. 29-1, PageID.511 Filed 01/26/26 Page 22 of 32
This Court should therefore reject Coinbase’s boundless interpretation of a “swap” and give effect to both statutes by excluding sports-betting contracts, such as Coinbase’s, from the CEA’s definition of “swap.” Such an interpretation, in any case, is more faithful to the CEA’s statutory language and legislative intent. See 156 Cong. Rec. S5906–07 (daily ed. July 15, 2010) (statement of Sen. Lincoln) (“It would be quite easy to construct an ‘event contract’ around sporting events such as the Super Bowl, the Kentucky Derby, and Masters Golf Tournament. These types of contracts would not serve any real commercial purpose. Rather, they would be used solely for gambling.”). D. Coinbase’s Theory Does Not Meet the Standard for Implied Repeals. Coinbase’s preemption argument must be rejected because it would manufacture an implied repeal of IGRA where none exists. Coinbase cannot meet the heavy burden of proving Congress intended to repeal IGRA because there is a reasonable interpretation of the CEA that gives full effect to both statutes: the CEA’s definition of “swap”—and thus the CFTC’s jurisdiction over such transactions—simply does not extend to Coinbase’s sports bets. Courts apply the “strong presumption that repeals by implication are disfavored and that Congress will specifically address preexisting law when it wishes to suspend its normal operations in a later statute.” Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis , 584 U.S. 497, 510 (2018); see Beckert v. Our Lady of Angels Apartments,
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