Case 4:25-cv-14092-SDK-KGA ECF No. 29-1, PageID.514 Filed 01/26/26 Page 25 of 32
activity on DCMs at all. See 7 U.S.C. § 7a-2(c)(5)(C)(i)–(ii). The CFTC acted consistently with Congress’s intent by promulgating its blanket prohibition of event contracts involving gaming. 17 C.F.R. § 40.11(a)(1). Coinbase’s partner, Kalshi, even acknowledged this fact in a brief filed with the D.C. Circuit (mere weeks before launching its nationwide sports betting app). See Appellee Br. at 41, KalshiEX LLC v. CFTC , No. 24-5205 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 15, 2024), Doc. No. 2085055 (“An event contract thus involves ‘gaming’ if it is contingent on a game or game-related event. The classic example is a contract on the outcome of a sporting event; as the legislative history directly confirms, Congress did not want sports betting to be conducted on derivatives markets .” (emphasis added, citation omitted)). That the CEA and IGRA overlap here is due only to Coinbase’s backdoor attempt to evade comprehensive gaming regulations. Furthermore, only Coinbase (a private company with a direct financial interest in its sports-betting activity), not Congress or the CFTC, claims that the CEA’s definition of “swap” displaces tribal, state, and federal regulation of sports betting. The text and legislative history of the 2010 CEA amendments, as well as subsequent CFTC actions, confirm that the CFTC was not established to regulate sports betting, let alone assume the role of the nation’s sole sports-betting regulator. See Event Contracts, 89 Fed. Reg. 48968, 48982–83 (Jun. 10, 2024) (“The [CFTC] notes that in the United States, gambling is overseen by state
16
Made with FlippingBook - Online catalogs