Case 4:25-cv-14092-SDK-KGA ECF No. 29-1, PageID.516 Filed 01/26/26 Page 27 of 32
This Court should therefore reject Coinbase’s preemption argument requiring an implied repeal of IGRA. II. The Major Questions Doctrine Forecloses Coinbase’s Theory. In 2010, the Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act (“PASPA”) prohibited sports betting nationwide. Coinbase’s position thus posits that the CEA not only to eradicated state and federal gaming laws by preemption or implied repeal, but also reversed the federal policy that prohibited sports betting at the time —turning it instead into a nationwide authorization of such betting under the sole jurisdiction of the CFTC. 13 Whether Congress did so is a major question. 14 Under the Major Questions Doctrine, courts have “reason to hesitate before concluding that Congress meant to confer” agency authority in “extraordinary 13 Coinbase’s sports-betting contracts also violate other federal laws, including the Wire Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1084, the Illegal Gambling Business Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1955, and the Travel Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1952. If Congress authorized sports betting via the CEA in 2010, then it also effectively limited the scope of these federal laws, in addition to PASPA. 14 In addition to the Major Questions Doctrine, this Court could further find that the Doctrine of Constitutional Avoidance forecloses Coinbase’s arguments. Specifically, Coinbase’s reliance on Kalshi’s self-certifications of its sports-betting contracts violates the private nondelegation doctrine because it is based upon an understanding of the CEA that empowers Kalshi—a private, for-profit entity—to oversee an entire sports betting enterprise while simultaneously failing to provide any meaningful mechanism for advance public comment, mandatory agency oversight, or standards by which the CFTC can implement its discretion. See FCC v. Consumers’ Rsch ., 606 U.S. 656, 693, 697 (2025).
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